By Teresa Maldonado /Pikara Magazine*

Illustration: Mrs. Milton

Following the article on freedom of expression and hate speech published in Pikara Magazine last summer, I've received messages from friends on both sides of the debate (I have friends—and enemies, I'm afraid—on both sides of the debate, and especially in the middle, which is the broadest and most crowded). It's striking that all those who are very clear about their position on one extreme or the other always consider it to be "the others," those on the other side, who have more and better means to spread their message and their point of view; that it is "the others" who are the least respectful, the most violent in the discussion, and the least rigorous in their analysis. Regarding content, one of the disputed issues is the appropriateness of using the terminology that distinguishes cis/trans. What follows is a reflection on this last point.

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I follow Násara ⚢ @SahrawiFeminist on Twitter. A few weeks ago she wrote the following on her account: “(…) I am going to explain why we are called 'Cis'. We are called that because being born a woman and fitting into the corset of femininity is supposedly a privilege.” She then spins a thread recounting the restrictions, limitations, prohibitions, fears, taboos, and exclusions with which she was educated and socialized during her childhood and youth in the Sahrawi refugee camp where she was born. And she ends by concluding, among other things: “Having said all this, don't call me 'Cis,' don't romanticize the femininity that has been imposed on me since I can remember and that has done and continues to do so much harm. Don't stop me from fighting against gender because I know firsthand its consequences for women.”

Along those same lines, one of my friends who wrote to me after the article on freedom of expression told me that feminists can't be cis because we fight against the imposition of gender. For her, therefore, as for Nássara @SahrawiFeminist, being cis means accepting (or not fighting against) the imposition of gender. I'll leave for another occasion the question of whether we should "abolish" gender, as this friend and many other feminists propose, or "fight against it," as Násara @SahrawiFeminist wants, or whether it's more about "undoing" it (as Judith Butler in the title of one of her books), what each of these actions would consist of (abolishing, fighting against, undoing), and to what extent they are divergent, distinct, complementary, or even the same? (Wow, that would be great!).

Wikipedia informs us of the following: “Cisgender (abbreviated as cis) is a neologism and technical term of German origin belonging to the interdisciplinary field of gender studies, a term used to refer to those individuals whose gender identity coincides with their sexual phenotype. The opposite of cisgender is called transgender. The neologism was introduced in 1991 by the German psychiatrist and sexologist Volkmar Sigusch.” It then alludes to some of the twists and turns we can get into if we consider the difference between cisgender and cissexual, parallel to that between transsexual and transgender. But we'll leave that aside for now as well.

On this occasion, I want to focus solely on the cis/trans distinction. It's true that some of us don't like what we understand as excessive reference to (our) cis status. We may have a political and privilege problem, I don't rule it out. Among those who don't like the constant reference to the distinction between cis and trans women or people, there are some (among whom I no longer count myself) who particularly dislike being referred to (or described as adjectives, we'll see later) as cis and point out a series of objections, along the lines of those I mentioned above. Násara's thread @SahrawiFeminist highlights this discomfort or disagreement with the repeated use of the prefix cis. In reality, I think more than disagreement, it's a discomfort that, like all discomforts, is difficult to define and objectify, but which is presented as a theoretical disagreement, I think in a somewhat forced way. Let's see.

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It is well known that the prefix cis means "on this side" in Latin, the opposite of trans, which would be "on the other side." Hence, one can speak, for example, of the cismundane to refer to what takes place in this world, as opposed to the transmundane, which would happen beyond. But I believe the reason for using this terminology has to do not with the meanings of words (with semantics) but with their structural relationships (with syntax). Specifically, with the distinction made in linguistics between "marked" and "unmarked" terms. According to this distinction, the "unmarked" refers to the most abundant extralinguistic referents of a term; it would be the general, the rule that can (and often does) have exceptions. The "marked," on the other hand, refers to the particular, to what is not abundant, to the exception that confirms the rule. For example: if in our everyday speech we say on the one hand “men” and on the other “black men”, we show that the extralinguistic referent of the “unmarked” term (men) is in fact white men, and that to refer to black men we must specify it, that is, “mark” it in the language with an adjective that specifies which men we are talking about.

Similarly, if we say "women" on the one hand and "trans women" on the other, it becomes clear that trans women are not, in fact, included in the (unmarked) category of women. However, when we speak of "cis women" on the one hand and "trans women" on the other, we are understanding and implying that the (unmarked) category of women must include both, and that if we want to refer only to one or only to the other, we must mark the noun "woman" in both cases: cis women and trans women. In this way, "trans woman" ceases to be the marked term and is syntactically equated with "cis woman." This means that "women"—unmarked—includes (must include) both types of women.

Although it's not usually explicit, this is the approach taken by one side of the feminist dispute; the other side refuses to accept it because it amounts to saying that either trans women aren't "real" women, or trans women are just that—trans women, but not women per se. Refusing to use the cis label implies maintaining trans as a mark of exception or minority, which, on the other hand, is not entirely true, given that trans women are, indeed, a minority within the category of women (just like men).

As you can see, the concept of "unmarked" in linguistics is very similar to that of "default" (used in computer science and other fields). It manifests when someone tells us, for example, "I saw a man in the distance," and we automatically, without realizing it, think of a white man, implicitly assuming that if the one who saw had been a black man, he would surely have told us "I saw a black man in the distance." This automatism is the product of a racist bias similar in form to the androcentric bias. However, what we unconsciously imagine by default when we hear a common noun without an adjective ("man") is highly conditioned by the context: it is not the same whether the sender and/or the receiver of the message ("I saw a man in the distance") is a white person or a black person; the reference that comes to mind also varies depending on whether the phrase is spoken and heard in Harlem, a village in Siberia, or a Central African city.

Distinguishing between cis and trans people routinely prevents the semantic leap that feminist linguists have seen and denounced in the use of the grammatical masculine as a generic. In the case at hand, the semantic leap would occur if people say things like, "Women have many disadvantages in patriarchal societies; in fact, when they reach menopause..." If we grant the benefit of the doubt (something we always do to make the semantic leap happen) that the first reference to women includes both cis and trans women, the mention of menopause (which only cis women go through) makes it clear that the hidden reference to women was only cis women.

Using the generic term in a (supposedly) inclusive way has some additional flaws: it renders invisible those who name the marked terms, who are always human groups subject to some form of discrimination or subordination. Feminism had to denounce the fact that the noun "man," when intended as a synonym for humanity, functioned as an unmarked term for an androcentric pair (man-woman), rendering women invisible.

However, despite all of the above, and being aware that all these reasons exist, I don't think we should stop saying phrases like the one above about menopause or that we should stop referring to things like "the history of women" because it's apparently more correct to say "the history of cis women." As I've tried to explain, I don't doubt that there's a theoretical basis for using that terminology (binary and dichotomous as they come, by the way). But I don't think we should always and systematically use it. I think it's more transformative in the long run and fairer to all women in the short run to shift the extralinguistic referent of the unmarked terms "woman" or "man" so that if something like "women during menopause..." is said, it's fine with a parenthetical (or, in verbal communication, a clarification along the way) like: "Obviously, at this point we're referring to cis women."

I believe that using the cis/trans distinction only occasionally when necessary, and not systematically, can help feminist discourse be understood by everyone, not just by those who are new to it. And I also believe that the latter—being understood by as many people as possible—is an urgent need for feminism right now.

Let's keep in mind that in the cis/trans distinction there are not (as is the case with male/female androcentrism) two nouns, but rather one, "women," which is then described as cis or trans. This is not a minor difference. This is related to the fact that women are not a minority (although they are often treated as such), but rather half of humanity. Even less are women a specific type of "man." It's not possible to extend the extralinguistic referents of "man" to include women: we must speak of persons or human beings. On the other hand, with the noun "women," if we have been insisting that women are plural, diverse, and heterogeneous, let's accept that this enormous plurality of ways of being a woman includes trans women.

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But what has been said so far doesn't explain why some feminists tend to systematically use the cis/trans dichotomy while others seem to get hives. To understand why this is the case, why some use it with relish and others stubbornly avoid it, we must consider the connotations that have been imbued with its use and avoidance.

It's evident that each feminist movement tends to use one vocabulary and not another . The type of vocabulary used by each feminist movement gives us a clue about the conceptions it subscribes to. Descriptions of the world speak as much about the world being described as about the person doing the describing. This isn't unique to feminism; every social group uses a vocabulary that identifies it as such. Through the use of language, we show which tribe we belong to (or which tribe we want to belong to: using a certain language can be a way of gaining recognition for admission to that group). Just as we show our allegiance to a social group or subgroup, we also differentiate ourselves from others through language. When we systematically resort to cis/trans terminology, we proclaim our allegiance to a certain movement, to a certain feminist subculture... in opposition to another (or others). Similarly, by refusing to use that (or other) terminology, dismissing it as "newspeak," we place ourselves in a very specific feminist position. But not only that: we also protest against the establishment (“imposition,” some might say) of terms for debate that we do not accept because “what we are going to discuss” is not unrelated to “on what terms we are going to do so” (…terrorism or armed struggle?). Thomas Szasz put it clearly in The Second Sin : “In the animal kingdom, the rule is: eat or be eaten; in the human kingdom: define or be defined.” That is why “the first to speak imposes reality on the other.”

I don't like to talk about "Newspeak" because doing so would place me on a side I neither want nor can find myself on, but I won't deny that I share the concerns of those who do use this George Orwellian . That is to say: I'm not comfortable on the other side either (and, above all, I'm uncomfortable with the fact that there are sides within feminism ). As I've already pointed out, I think the proliferation of incomprehensible jargon and cryptic terminology suitable only for insiders in recent years is very worrying within feminism . Feminism must be understood by the majority of people. But this whole issue of feminist language is material for another reflection. As for the use of the cis/trans distinction, I think feminists should use it, but not turn it into a mark of allegiance to any side in any war between us; that's why it's best to use it when appropriate and not systematically.

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On the other hand, it is trivial to note that people belonging to the trans community disagree on the linguistic (and, therefore, ontological and political) treatment that should be given to their condition (just as cis people or any other human group disagree). For some of them, it is convenient to literally substantialize, that is, treat their condition as a transsexual or transgender person as substantive (with a name or noun), abandoning the adjectival status that the term "trans" usually has in current usage. We can do so or not, but we must know that what we do in this area is not without consequences and, above all, reveals our conceptions about the question of sex/gender, which is central to feminism.

When we talk about trans and cis women (or men), we are talking about a type of women (or men); in this linguistic way of putting it, the substantive thing (what has substance) is being a woman, and the characteristic of being trans is an adjective, formally equal to being cis (one could say: only formally equal). This is the position of those who say of trans women, “they are women, period.” On the other hand, if we stop using the words trans, transsexual, or transgender as adjectives and use them as nouns, we substantiate the fact of being trans [1]. When we talk about “trans women” or “trans men,” we are conceiving things differently [2]. We are recognizing more substantial differences between being a woman in one way or another, between being a cis woman or being a trans woman. In fact, we are adopting an ontology according to which the world should consist, rather, of women, men, and trans people (cis women, cis men, and trans people) [3]. We would be giving ontological weight (always associated, I insist, with a certain political conception) to the fact of being one thing or another (cis or trans), separating rather than conceptually merging cis women and trans women. We would be, in a way, accepting (some would say "recognizing") the idea that trans people are not women (or men) "and that's it," but rather a very specific and particular way of being women (or men); so much so that being a cis woman and being a trans woman cease to be modalities of the same thing and are instead conceived as different things: different substances to which different nouns correspond.

This way of approaching the issue differs from what I proposed above. According to that proposal, rather than constantly marking the nouns "woman" and "man," systematically specifying whether we are talking about cis or trans women (or men), what would be necessary is to redefine the semantic content of "woman" (or "man") so that the referent of these nouns is not only cis people. I will not hide the fact that I personally have doubts about the most appropriate way to address the issue. Other issues that intersect with what is analyzed here and that go beyond this linguistic reflection should be taken into consideration, such as the passing [4] of trans people. What I have no doubt about is that there must be a place within feminism for this discussion. It is a discussion, obviously, that cannot take place without the participation of trans feminists (note: not all trans feminists are transfeminists, nor do they necessarily subscribe to some version of queer ).

I think we should start by realizing that this is a very complex issue that can also be very delicate. That 's why it's necessary to avoid lynchings and rending of garments . We can't be insensitive (for example, to the suffering or anxiety of others), but neither can we display a hypersensitive sensitivity that censures disagreement or disapproves of ignorance and shuts down discussion before it even begins. A little empathy, good faith, and that famous care should be enough to delve into this labyrinthine issue. For my part, I point out that, in the face of transfeminisms and various trans or post-humanisms, the way out of the labyrinth lies in the reconstruction of humanism , so battered in recent times . I say this convinced, of course, that feminism is a humanism. And that women's rights and trans rights are, all, human rights that we feminists must defend.

*This article was originally published on Pikara. To learn more about our partnership with this outlet, click here .

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[1] I think this is partly an understanding of what Miquel Misé in his book A la conquista del cuerpo errores (A Conquest of the Wrong Body ), published by Egales.[2] Others would prefer to say “les trans,” which I disagree with, although I won’t go into that here. What we do need to address more precisely is the linguistic issue of the substantivation of adjectives. According to the RAE (Spanish Royal Academy of Spanish Language), “mother” is a noun and “lesbian” is an adjective. However, just as we can make sentences in which “mother” is the subject (“the mothers of the group got up angry”), we can do the same with “lesbians always get up happy in the mornings”). In this last example, as in any other that we could use with, for example, “the feminists” (another adjective, according to the RAE), what has occurred is an ellipsis of the adjectival noun: we would be talking about lesbian (and/or feminist) women, only the noun “women” would be elided. The ellipsis of the noun is a syntactical process, while substantivization itself is a lexical process. It is interesting to note that for language (or for the Academy) "mother" has substance in itself (and is not an adjective, it does not denote a possible quality or attribute of the noun "woman"), while "feminist", "lesbian", "transsexual" or "young" are adjectives, that is, they do not have their own entity; they are forms in which it is possible to be a woman, they allude to classes, to types of women. In other words: "mother" or "woman" would answer the question "what am I?", and "feminist", "lesbian", "transsexual" or "young" would answer "what am I?" or "what kind of woman am I?"[3] Ontology and ethics are parts of Philosophy. Just as ethics studies "what should be," ontology deals with "being," with what exists. We can adopt different ontologies; To put it with the graphic example of the philosopher Ulysses Moulines : it is as correct to say that inside a drawer there are scissors and buttons, as to say that there are elementary particles moving through electromagnetic fields. Celia Amorós has explained that every ontology presupposes and implies a political theory and an ethic.[5] Passing in trans people alludes to the fact that it is “noticeable” or not that they are trans.